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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Congress sought to encourage a form of a retirement fund known
as an employee stock ownership plan (“ESOP”).1 The statutory mandates of
these plans are outlined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

1. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (explaining the Congressional findings and policy aims of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
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(“ERISA”).2 ESOPs are invested in stock of the company in which the
employee works.3 In this way, ESOP planners’ (“plan fiduciaries”)
obligations are necessarily unique.4 Whereas most fiduciaries are required
to prudently diversify investments to protect their beneficiaries, ESOP
planners are not similarly mandated.5 Further, Congress allows ESOP
planners to concurrently be officers of the corporation in which the stock was
invested.6 This exception makes it much more likely that a plan fiduciary
will, at some point, have access to insider information pertinent to the fund.7
Issues arise when a plan fiduciary is also an officer of the corporation that
the ESOP is primarily invested in.8 If that corporate officer/plan fiduciary
knows the corporation is engaged in fraud, courts have struggled to
determine what duties the plan fiduciary acquires relative to ESOP plan
beneficiaries.9 Plaintiffs have suggested the plan fiduciary must divest the
fund, diversify the fund, and/or disclose the fraud.10

2. See id.
3. E.g., Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP.

OWNERSHIP, https://www.esop.org/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2021) (discussing the
advantages of ESOPs, such as increased wages and retirement assets for employees and
higher growth rates for companies that offer ESOPs).
4. See generally The Fiduciary’s Guide to Conflict of Interest Claims, RMO LLP,
https://rmolawyers.com/fiduciarys-guide-conflict-of-interest-claims/ (last visited Sept.
29, 2021) (noting that most fiduciaries are obligated to protect beneficiaries’ interests
above their own at all times, in all situations).
5. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 416–17 (2014)
(acknowledging that the nature of ESOPs absolves plan fiduciaries of an obligation to
diversify because the duty to diversify necessarily contradicts the nature of ESOPs).
6. See In re Wells Fargo ERISA 401(K) Litig., 331 F. Supp. 3d 868, 877 (D. Minn.
2018) (stating that ERISA does not prohibit corporate insiders from serving as plan
fiduciaries of ESOPs). See generally Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the
Supreme Court, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 375 (1992) (noting the principle of statutory
interpretation that when Congress knows how to legislate in an area and chooses not to,
Congressional silence should not be interpreted as unintentional).
7. See generally COREY ROSEN, ET AL., THE INSIDE ESOP FIDUCIARY HANDBOOK
(Nat’l Ctr. for Emp. Ownership, 4th ed. 2020) (detailing the inherent increased risk of
serving as an ESOP fiduciary and corporate officer concurrently).
8. See
Will
Kenton,
Insider
Information,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insiderinformation.asp (last updated Mar. 21,
2020) (summarizing how corporate officers may obtain insider information and what
liabilities can arise from using such information).
9. Compare Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 632 (2d Cir. 2018)
(finding there may be a duty to disclose the insider information), with Martone v. Robb,
902 F.3d 519, 528 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding a duty to disclose insider information
implausible), and Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding a
duty to stop future stock purchases implausible).
10. See Jander, 910 F.3d at 623; Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 771 (8th
Cir. 2020).
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In Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer,11 the Supreme Court established
that plaintiffs who claim the plan fiduciary knew of fraud are required to
propose a plausible alternative action that the plan fiduciary could have taken
that could not have been viewed as more likely to harm the fund.12 Since
Dudenhoeffer, the Circuit Courts have disagreed on whether plaintiffs satisfy
that burden when alleging that a plan fiduciary should have disclosed the
fraud.13
In 2020, in Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co.,14 the Eighth Circuit sided with the
Fifth Circuit, holding that a plaintiff suing under 29 U.S.C. § 1104’s standard
of “care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances” cannot
plausibly allege a fiduciary duty arises to disclose the company’s own
fraudulent behavior to correct the inflated value of stock in the ESOP.15
Contrarily, in Jander v. Retirement Plans Committee of IBM16 the Second
Circuit is the only Circuit to find that plaintiffs can plausibly plead earlier
disclosure of the fraud is required by the fiduciary’s duty-of-prudence.17
Part II of this Comment establishes that Dudenhoeffer directed the Circuits
to determine whether the duty-of-prudence describes: (1) a plan fiduciary
who discloses their company’s own fraudulent behavior; or (2) a plan
fiduciary who protects the ESOP from the damage public knowledge of the
fraudulent behavior would cause.18 Part III analyzes how the Second Circuit
is more faithful to the Dudenhoeffer inquiry. More specifically, Part III
argues that Jander better conforms with Dudenhoeffer’s balance inquiry, that
general economic principles provide appropriate support for Jander’s
conclusion, and that the health of retirement funds, like ESOPs, cannot be
evaluated on short-term time scales. Part IV recommends the Supreme Court
resolve the disagreement between the circuits. First, the Court should side
with the Second Circuit’s finding that plaintiffs can plausibly plead the duty11. 573 U.S. 409 (2014).
12. See id. at 429–30.
13. Compare Jander, 910 F.3d at 623 (holding that plaintiffs did plausibly plead

disclosure, satisfying the standard), with Allen, 967 F.3d at 774 (holding that plaintiffs
failed to meet the standard when proposing disclosure was an available alternative).
14. 967 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2020).
15. See Allen, 967 F.3d at 772, 774 (following Martone and criticizing the Second
Circuit for finding the opposite); see also Martone, 902 F.3d at 527 (concluding that
plaintiffs failed to meet Dudenhoeffer’s test).
16. 910 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2018).
17. See Jander, 910 F.3d at 630 (finding that plaintiffs who allege that disclosure is
inevitable can plausibly allege that earlier disclosure was the more prudent course of
action).
18. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 429–30 (instructing the lower courts to consider
the plausibility of the disclosure alternative and whether freezing future stock purchases
is consistent with existing insider trading laws); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
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of-prudence is breached by a failure to disclose fraud. Alternatively, like in
Jander and Allen, where discovery of the fraud is inevitable, plaintiffs should
be allowed to plausibly plead earlier disclosure is required.
II. THE CIRCUITS CANNOT AGREE WHAT IS PLAUSIBLE UNDER
DUDENHOEFFER
At the heart of the circuit’s varying applications of the Court’s
Dudenhoeffer decision lies a fundamental disagreement over how courts
should analyze the plaintiff’s burden to prove that the plan fiduciary was
obligated to disclose the fraud. Resolving this disagreement requires
analyzing Dudenhoeffer’s underlying considerations, identifying where the
circuit courts have disagreed, and examining popular arguments defendants
in Dudenhoeffer cases use.
A. Dudenhoeffer: SCOTUS Tells the Circuit Courts to
“work it out amongst themselves”
Three cases define the disagreement.19 In 2014, the Supreme Court in
Dudenhoeffer, established a higher pleading requirement for plaintiffs
proceeding under ERISA’s duty-of-prudence standard, which resulted from
the Twombly/Iqbal paradigm shift.20 However, the Court entrusted the lower
courts with defining “plausible pleading” under ERISA.21
In Dudenhoeffer, the plaintiffs were participants in an ESOP.22 The
participants sued their employer and various officers under ERISA for
allegedly breaching their fiduciary duty by continuing to invest the ESOP in
assets — the employer’s stock — the defendants knew to be risky and
overvalued because the company was engaged in fraud.23 The plaintiffs
alleged the defendants “knew or should have known” of the risk and the
inflated value of the investments based on the defendants’ access to nonpublic information.24 Initially, plaintiffs suggested ESOP planners may have

19. See generally Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 409 (defining the inquiry for the lower
courts); Jander, 910 F.3d at 620 (finding plaintiffs satisfied the test); Allen, 967 F.3d at
767 (finding plaintiffs did not satisfy the test).
20. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (marking a shift from the
pleading standard of “merely possible” to “plausible”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) (requiring a pleading be “plausible”).
21. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 429–30 (articulating the “plausible pleading” test
for the lower courts).
22. Id. at 413.
23. Id. (noting that Fifth Third Bancorp engaged in subprime mortgage lending
practices leading up to the 2008 housing market collapse).
24. Id.
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a duty to divest or diversify the ESOP.25 However, the Court unequivocally
stated that whatever fiduciary obligations ESOP planners may have, the duty
cannot plausibly be to violate insider trading laws specifically or securities
regulations generally.26
Under “the Dudenhoeffer standard,” plaintiffs may still claim a breach of
the duty-of-prudence if plaintiffs allege an alternative action could have been
taken, which was consistent with insider trading and securities regulations.27
This alternative course of action, however, must “plausibly allege an
alternative action that [the fiduciary] could have taken that would have been
consistent with [insider trading] laws and that a prudent fiduciary in the same
circumstances would [/could] not have viewed as more likely to harm the
fund than to help it.”28 Clearly, the “could” standard is a demanding
requirement.29 The Circuits disagree on whether disclosure of fraudulent
behavior fulfills the “could” standard.30
B. Other Considerations in Dudenhoeffer Reveal the Attitudes
of the Court Towards ERISA
While Dudenhoeffer left the disclosure question open, the unanimous
opinion written by Justice Breyer definitively foreclosed two arguments,
which may hint at the philosophical attitudes of the Supreme Court in ERISA
suits generally.31 First, the Court summarily eliminated the argument that
25. Id. (suggesting that the plan fiduciaries should have sold the stock before it
decreased in value).
26. See id. at 414–25 (noting several of the express exceptions made between general
laws of trusts and ESOP fiduciary duties because of the unique nature of ESOP funds).
27. See id. at 428–30 (defining plaintiff’s options as confined by insider trading
laws).
28. Id. at 428 (emphasis added) (“[A] plaintiff must plausibly allege an alternative
action that the defendant could have taken that would have been consistent with the
securities laws and that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have
viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it.”); id. at 429–30 (emphasis added)
(“[L]ower courts faced with such claims should also consider whether the complaint has
plausibly alleged that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant’s position could not have
concluded that stopping purchases . . . or publicly disclosing . . . would do more harm
than good . . . .”).
29. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 626 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting
that Dudenhoeffer’s “could” language suggests not what an average fiduciary would do,
but what any reasonable fiduciary does).
30. Compare id. at 630–31 (finding that fraud, which will inevitably be disclosed,
ought to be disclosed earlier), with Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 773–74
(8th Cir. 2020) (finding that any disclosure of fraud is subject to a reasonable concern
that the stock will drop in value).
31. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 424–30 (noting the Court rejected a presumption
of prudent investing because it was too defense-friendly and violated plan beneficiaries’
ability to exercise their rights under ERISA).
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defendants were obligated to attempt to “outperform” the market based
purely on public information.32 In the Court’s view, individual fiduciaries
cannot be expected to be more skilled at valuing a stock than the aggregate
knowledge of the entire stock market, which produces public stock
evaluations.33 Simply put, given the same information, a single plan
fiduciary cannot be expected to better evaluate a stock than the collective
wisdom of the entire market combined, absent special circumstances.34
Second, the Court rejected the argument that defendants’ investment
decisions in ERISA-ESOP, breach of duty-of-prudence cases are entitled to
a “presumption of prudence.”35 This holding, while not directly at issue in
the current disagreement, nonetheless illuminates the attitudes of the Court.
The holding supports the use of general economic principles to support a
court’s analysis in an ESOP stock-drop case.36 Moreover, the second
foreclosed argument was deemed too “defense-friendly” and violative of the
“careful balancing” of ERISA between encouraging ESOP use and enforcing
the rights of ESOP beneficiaries.37
Specifically, in rejecting the
“presumption of prudence,” the Court noted that granting such a presumption
would foreclose virtually all ESOP plan beneficiaries’ claims against
fiduciaries, which was a step too far in the Court’s view.38
32. See id. at 426 (spending only three paragraphs rejecting the argument that ESOP
fiduciaries were not entitled to rely on public information of stocks’ market values and
further characterizing the argument as “implausible as a general rule, at least in the
absence of special circumstances”).
33. See id. (citing Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fun, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 273
(2014)) (relying on what “many investors” think about trying to outperform the market).
34. See Hutch Ashoo & Chris Snyder, Why Trying to ‘Beat the Market’ Doesn’t
Work and Is the Wrong Question, PILLAR WEALTH MGMT. CO., https://pillarwm.com/
how-to-outperform-the-stock-market-100-foolproof-guide/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2021)
(noting the inherently speculative nature of trying to outperform markets with active day
trading).
35. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 418–19 (contrasting the loosened standard for
diversification for ESOP, which is grounded in the statute, with the presumption of
prudence which is not grounded in the statute).
36. See id.; see also, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S.
445 (2013) (discussing market theory throughout the opinion). See generally David
D’Alessandro et al., Stock Drop Litigation Cases Are On The Rise: Will Your Retirement
Plan Be A Target?, JDSUPRA (July 23, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
stock-drop-litigation-cases-are-on-the-78743/ (explaining that stock-drop cases are those
that result from a sudden drop in the price of an investor’s stock).
37. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 424 (acknowledging that the concern to uphold
Congress’s intent to encourage ESOP creation was valid, but that the presumption was
too defense-friendly to overcome competing concerns of Congress’s desire to uphold the
rights of plan beneficiaries).
38. See id. (finding that the presumption “makes it impossible for a plaintiff to state
a duty-of-prudence claim, no matter how meritorious, unless the employer is in very bad
economic circumstances” and that the better approach is a context specific analysis of
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C. Dudenhoeffer Suggested Just Two Avenues to
Recovery for ESOP Plaintiffs
The Dudenhoeffer Court set forth a three-part analysis for lower courts to
consider, which both the Second and Eighth Circuits later employed.39 First,
courts must remember that a duty-of-prudence, under both ERISA and the
common law of trusts, does not require fiduciaries to take illegal action; for
example, violating insider trading laws.40
Second, where a complaint proposes a plan fiduciary should have stopped
purchasing the employer’s stock or should have publicly disclosed the fraud,
courts should consider what implication this may have on other bodies of
law.41 The Court noted that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) had not filed amici or otherwise made its views known.42 And while
the SEC’s precise view of the law remains unknown,43 in 2020, the SEC
filed a letter supporting foreclosing plaintiff’s arguments in Jander, but did
not elaborate further.44 Third, courts must consider whether the complaint
plausibly alleges: (1) stopping purchases; or (2) publicly disclosing, in the
eyes of any reasonable fiduciary, could not have been viewed as likely to
cause more harm than good.45 At a minimum, if a plan fiduciary could
articulate any reasonable hypothetical which would make the proposed
action more harmful, plaintiffs cannot recover.46
In effect, Dudenhoeffer leaves plaintiffs only two avenues to recovery,
the complaint’s allegations).
39. See id. at 428–30 (stating the requisite analysis and three important
considerations accompanying the analysis); see also Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM,
910 F.3d 620, 622, 626 (2d Cir. 2020); Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 772
(8th Cir. 2020).
40. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 428–29 (articulating that whatever duty
fiduciaries may have, it cannot be to “break the law”).
41. See id. at 429 (noting that while Congress anticipated a “common law of ERISA”
would emerge, courts should not impose upon areas of law that concern the purview of
other agencies, like the SEC).
42. Id.
43. See SEC, https://secsearch.sec.gov/search?utf8=%3F&affiliate=secsearch&que
ry=Dudenhoeffer (last visited Mar. 25, 2021) (searching “Dudenhoeffer” on the SEC’s
website and locating no formal opinion or comment).
44. See Brief for Petitioner at 16–17, Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, No. 20289 (petition for cert. filed Sept. 1, 2020), 2020 WL 5785563 (noting the SEC’s view
that defendants should prevail but abstaining from setting forth a proposed rule).
45. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 428–29 (implying that, by foreclosing all other
plaintiff theories of stock-drop cases, these two avenues are likely plaintiff’s last
remaining viable arguments).
46. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 622–23 (2d Cir. 2020)
(employing the “more restrictive test” even though the parties disagreed about the proper
standard).
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absent special circumstances not defined by the current case law.47 Plaintiffs
can either propose that fiduciaries should have: (1) stopped purchasing
employer stock; or (2) publicly disclosed the fraud.48 Thus far, all other
avenues to recovery presented to the circuit court in breach of duty-ofprudence cases have been rejected.49
D. The Second Circuit, Leader in Finance Cases,
Holds the Door Open for Plaintiffs
In 2018, the Second Circuit, in Jander, engaged in the Dudenhoeffer
analysis.50 In Jander, plaintiffs alleged that defendants — IBM’s corporate
officers and ESOP plan fiduciaries — knew or should have known that IBM
was overvaluing its microelectronics department through creative
accounting.51 Employing the Dudenhoeffer analysis, plaintiffs proposed two
alternative courses of action prudent IBM fiduciaries should have taken: (1)
stop investing in IBM stock; and/or (2) publicly disclose the overvaluation
problem.52 To bolster their public disclosure argument, Jander further
alleged that because IBM intended to sell the microelectronics department
soon, discovery of the overvaluation was inevitable and should have been
disclosed earlier to mitigate harm to the stock.53 On appeal, Jander dropped
the halting IBM stock purchases argument and limited the appeal to the
proposed alternative of disclosure.54
The Jander court expanded on the analysis Dudenhoeffer left open.55
47. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 426 (foreclosing plaintiff’s proposed alternatives,
but leaving open possible exceptions if “special circumstances” are present).
48. See id. at 425–28 (implying these two avenues are the only likely arguments
available to plaintiffs, given that all other ones presented in the circuit courts have been
expressly rejected).
49. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 577 U.S. 308 (2016) (per curiam); see also Laffen
v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 721 F. App’x 642 (9th Cir. 2018).
50. Jander, 910 F.3d at 622–23.
51. Id. at 623 (suggesting that this overvaluation was evidenced by their willingness
to offload the microelectronics department by paying GlobalFoundries to take the
microelectronics department from IBM).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 629 (bolstering this claim by noting that if the fraud were discovered
later, the protracted nature of the fraud would undermine faith in future IBM
pronouncements).
54. Id. at 628–29 (citing economic analyses that suggest protracted fraud incurs a
reputational impact that fraud over shorter periods of time and/or self-disclosed does
not).
55. See id. at 628 (acknowledging the conflict between the “would” burden and the
“could” burden, allowing plaintiffs to rely on economic theories to establish plausible
alternatives, and rejecting defendants’ arguments that Dudenhoeffer cases invoke the
heightened pleading standard for a fraud claim).
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First, Jander highlighted an important balance acknowledged by Congress
and the Supreme Court between the fair enforcement of the rights of ESOP
participants and beneficiaries against the encouragement of the creation and
use of ESOPs.56 Second, Jander highlighted a tension between the
demanding “could not have” test and the implied desire of the Dudenhoeffer
court to allow plaintiffs to plead their claims.57 Third, Jander noted that the
heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) is only
activated when a plaintiff either directly alleges fraud as a cause of action or
invokes the fraud exception under ERISA to the statute of limitations.58
i.

Jander Followed Dudenhoeffer’s Balancing Consideration

Jander acknowledged the balance between participant rights and ESOP
encouragement.59 Jander highlights precisely what the lower courts have
Saddling fiduciaries with an
struggled with post-Dudenhoeffer.60
uncomfortable duty to disclose fraud based on insider information could
disincentivize the creation of ESOPs, which Congress explicitly sought to
encourage.61 Contrarily, labeling disclosure as an “implausible” proposed
alternative action could foreclose plaintiffs from ever enforcing their rights
as participants and beneficiaries of ESOPs.62 The tension between these
considerations is foundational to the post-Dudenhoeffer divergence.63 The
Fifth and Eighth Circuits find that the balance between beneficiary rights and
ESOP creation would be violated because Jander’s ruling would discourage
ESOP creation because of liability risks.64 Contrarily, Jander argues that a
56. See id. at 625–26 (noting that the presumption of prudence struck down in
Dudenhoeffer was a poor means of addressing concerns that frivolous suits would
discourage the creation of ESOPs).
57. See id. at 627–28 (explaining the “could not” formulation is a more demanding
standard).
58. See id. at 632 (noting that the heightened pleading standard, which exists to
protect defendants from the stigma of being accused of fraud, is not applicable in stockdrop cases where plaintiffs are not alleging fraud but are alleging imprudent investing,
which has no such stigma).
59. See id. at 625–26 (explaining the requisite balancing interests of Congress).
60. See Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 2020) (disagreeing
with Jander without distinguishing the facts but criticizing the use of “general economic
principles,” which could apply in every ESOP stock-drop case).
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (listing the findings that led Congress to enact ERISA).
62. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 427–29 (2014)
(foreclosing all of plaintiffs’ proposed alternatives except disclosure, and perhaps, the
halting of future stock purchases).
63. Cf. Jander, 910 F.3d at 626 (arguing that a fact-specific inquiry best balances the
encouragement of ESOP creation and use, while not making all plaintiffs’ recovery
impossible).
64. See Allen, 967 F.3d at 767; Martone v. Robb, 902 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2018).
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sufficiently context-specific approach quells these concerns while not
foreclosing all plaintiffs from recovering.65
ii.

Jander Highlights the Need for Clarification of Which
Dudenhoeffer Standard Should Prevail

The parties in Jander “fundamentally” disputed the standard for a
plaintiff’s pleading in a duty-of-prudence case under ERISA.66 The dispute
arose from a discrepancy in Justice Breyer’s original opinion in
Dudenhoeffer.67 Early in the opinion, the test for a plaintiff’s plausible
pleading is stated as a proposed alternative action that a fiduciary “would
not” have viewed as more likely to harm the fund than benefit it.68 This
formulation suggests a test of what the average fiduciary would do.69 Later
in Dudenhoeffer, the Court rephrases the test as requiring plaintiffs to plead
an alternative course of action that a reasonably prudent fiduciary “could
not” have viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it.70 This
formulation suggests a stricter test similar to rational basis review.71 Where
a plaintiff in a rational basis test has to prove there is no rational basis for
government action, Dudenhoeffer plaintiffs have to prove no prudent
fiduciary would find the proposed alternative action objectionable.
The Jander court declined to decipher which test was the “correct” test
and found that plaintiffs even satisfied the stricter “could not” test.72 A likely
factor in the Jander court’s decision to ignore the “would not” test was the
Supreme Court’s reversal of a Ninth Circuit case, Amgen Inc. v. Harris,73 in
which the Court remanded the case with instructions to engage in
Dudnehoeffer’s analysis, citing the “could not” test.74 When remanding
Amgen, the Supreme Court cited the portion of Dudenhoeffer which used the
65. See Jander, 910 F.3d at 626.
66. See id. at 625–26 (noting that Dudenhoeffer considered the “correct standard” to

be the one that filtered out frivolous claims, which defendants argued was a stringent
“any prudent fiduciary standard”).
67. Compare Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 428 (suggesting a standard invoking an
average fiduciary), with id. at 430 (suggesting a standard invoking whether any
reasonable fiduciary would find disclosure more harmful).
68. Id. at 426–27.
69. See Jander, 910 F.3d at 626.
70. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 429–30.
71. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(establishing the rational basis test is satisfied if any single rational basis could exist for
Congressional action).
72. See Jander, 910 F.3d at 631.
73. 577 U.S. 308 (2016) (per curiam).
74. Id. at 309–11; see Jander, 910 F.3d at 627–28 (citing Amgen at length before
ultimately finding plaintiffs satisfied both tests).
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“could not” language, suggesting that test was the “correct” test.75
iii. Jander Rejects Defendants’ Attempts to Impose FRCP 9(b) on
Plaintiffs’ Pleadings
Finally, and most definitively, the Jander court summarily rejected a
common argument by defendants in stock-drop cases, that FRCP 9(b) applies
the heightened pleading standard to these cases.76 Although Dudenhoeffer
cases allege a fiduciary had knowledge of fraud, the allegations are of
fiduciary imprudence; and thus, do not merit the heightened pleading
standard under FRCP 9(b).77 An allegation of imprudent investing does not
carry the stigma of fraud — one of the rationales behind 9(b)’s heightened
pleading requirement.78 The Jander court cabined 9(b)’s reach in duty-ofprudence cases to those using the fraud exception to ERISA’s statute of
limitations.79
E. The Eighth Circuit Finds Plaintiffs’ Arguments Unconvincing
Without Engaging the Full Dudenhoeffer Analysis
In 2020, the Eighth Circuit decided Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co.,80 where
plaintiffs sued Wells Fargo and plan fiduciaries for breach of ERISA’s dutyof-prudence.81 Plaintiffs claimed that Wells Fargo engaged in aggressive
sales quotas, which necessarily pressured employees to open over 3.5 million
unauthorized accounts using existing customers’ confidential information.82
Plaintiffs further claimed that disclosure of the fraud was inevitable because
federal banking regulators had been investigating the matter for several
years.83 Plaintiffs’ claims stem from the resulting stock-drop.84
The Allen court partially employed the three-part analysis set forth in
Dudenhoeffer and followed by Jander.85 The Allen court quickly decided to
75. See Amgen, 577 U.S. at 311 (citing Dudenhoeffer’s “could not” language but not
explicitly resolving its apparent contradiction).
76. See Jander, 910 F.3d at 632 (noting the stigma rationale applicable to a fraud
accusation is not applicable to a breach-of-duty accusation).
77. Id.
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
79. See Jander, 910 F.3d at 632 (noting the court has also refrained from using 9(b)’s
heightened standard in other ERISA cases); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1113.
80. 967 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2020).
81. See id. at 770–71.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 771.
84. Id. (noting plaintiffs’ significant losses in the wake of the scandal).
85. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 428–30 (2014)
(outlining the necessary considerations for stock-drop cases); see also Allen, 967 F.3d at
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use the “could not” standard and ultimately found plaintiffs’ breach of dutyof-prudence claim implausible.86 While the court noted that the relevant
inquiry is a fact-intensive one, it saw the “could not” language as too
demanding a test for the Allen plaintiffs to overcome.87 The inquiry, the
court noted, is also temporally restrained, concerned only with the facts
known to the fiduciary at the time relevant to the cause of action.88
The Allen court rejected the plaintiffs’ duty-of-prudence claim by
embracing the Fifth Circuit’s view of similar cases.89 Additionally, it
expressed skepticism of Jander’s reliance on “general economic
principles.”90 The opinion highlights the divide between the two circuits’
interpretations of Dudenhoeffer.91
The Allen plaintiffs attempted to distinguish their case from the plaintiffs
in the Fifth Circuit by contending that their “duty to disclose” argument was
supported by the “fact” that discovery of the fraud was inevitable; an
argument the court noted Fifth Circuit plaintiffs made in Martone v. Robb.92
Under the argument, when fraud will inevitably be discovered and disclosed,
a reasonably prudent fiduciary will opt to disclose earlier rather than later,
because it is a “general economic principle” that fraud concealed over time
is more harmful than fraud that is disclosed quickly.93 The Allen court
summarized the Martone decision as rejecting this logic because: (1) if the
principle truly was “generally known” it would be applicable in virtually all
ERISA fraud cases; and (2) it contradicts the Fifth Circuit’s finding in
Whitley v. BP, P.L.C.94 that earlier disclosure of fraud could have been

772–73 (using the Dudenhoeffer inquiry).
86. See Allen, 967 F.3d at 774–75 (finding that even a short-term stock-drop satisfied
defendant’s burden).
87. See id. (finding that plaintiffs’ argument had merit, but that the argument was not
so convincing that the court would find that no “prudent fiduciary” would disagree).
88. Id. at 773 (specifying that only the facts known to the fiduciary at the time of the
investing decision can impose liability).
89. Id. (citing Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 2016); Martone v.
Robb, 902 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2018)).
90. See id. at 773–74 (expressing doubt on the theory that fraud inflicts more harm
on stock value the longer the fraud goes on).
91. See id. at 774 (criticizing Jander and putting forth its own view of the
Dudenhoeffer inquiry).
92. Id. at 773–74 (pointing to the ongoing investigation into the matter by
government regulators). See generally Martone v. Robb, 902 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2018)
(finding that even if inevitable discovery were sufficiently shown, plaintiffs failed to
meet the burden of the “could not” test).
93. Allen, 967 F.3d at 773 (citing Martone v. Robb, 902 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2018)).
94. 838 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2018).
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considered more harmful by a reasonably prudent fiduciary.95
The Allen court explicitly noted that Jander is the only case in which the
Dudenhoeffer standard was satisfied by a plaintiff with a disclosure of fraud
argument.96 The Allen court rejected Jander and called the “general
economic principle” too generic to be beneficial to plaintiffs and further
opined that an unusual disclosure made during a regulatory investigation
could do more harm than good.97
F. Defendants Rely on Pegram v. Herdrich, Seeking to Foreclose
Plaintiffs from Proceeding to Discovery
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Pegram v. Herdrich,98 which
involved an unusual set of facts that Dudenhoeffer defendants have since
used to argue that plaintiffs are barred from recovery.99 At face value,
Pegram’s holding seems to support such an outcome.100
Herdrich was an enrollee in a health maintenance organization (“HMO”)
where patients acquired pre-paid medical services.101 Pegram, a physician,
examined Herdrich for abdominal pain and, despite alarming symptoms,
decided Herdrich should wait eight days for an appointment at an HMO
facility with Pegram’s staff fifty miles away.102 Herdrich’s appendix burst
before the eight days and he suffered other complications.103
Herdrich made an ERISA (non-ESOP) claim against Pegram, who was a
fiduciary, because the medical services were pre-paid.104 The Court was

95. Allen, 967 F.3d at 773–74.
96. Id. at 774 (calling Jander the “sole instance” after recapping two sister circuits’

Dudenhoeffer cases finding for defendants).
97. See id. at 774–75 (noting the possibility of a greater stock drop if the disclosure
were made outside the normal reporting regime).
98. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
99. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 30 (summarizing Pegram’s holding:
“ERISA requires that ‘the fiduciary with two hats wear only one at a time, and wear the
fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions.’ Consequently ‘[i]n every case charging
breach of ERISA fiduciary duty’ the ‘threshold question’ is whether the defendant ‘was
acting as a fiduciary . . . when taking the action subject to complaint.’ If not, then ERISA
liability cannot attach.”).
100. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231 (asserting that plaintiffs cannot hold plan fiduciaries
liable for actions taken in a non-fiduciary capacity that are not for the sole benefit of plan
beneficiaries).
101. Id. at 215.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See ERISA:
Court Rules Physician HMO Has Fiduciary Duty, CAL.
HEALTHLINE (Apr. 23, 1999), https://californiahealthline.org/morning-breakout/erisacourt-rules-physician-hmo-has-fiduciary-duty/.
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ultimately unwilling to find that medical decisions made by Pegram while
treating Herdrich made Pegram liable for breaching a fiduciary duty.105
Importantly, the Court found that Pegram could only be liable for actions
taken in his capacity as a fiduciary not as a medical professional.106 In other
words, the two roles were separable.
III. JANDER IS NOT IMPERVIOUS BUT IS MORE FAITHFUL TO
DUDENHOEFFER’S STANDARDS AND GOALS
Only the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have published Dudenhoeffer
opinions.107 The disagreement results primarily from a single sentence in the
Court’s opinion in Dudenhoeffer: “[L]ower courts faced with such claims
should also consider whether the complaint has plausibly alleged that a
prudent fiduciary in the defendant’s position could not have concluded that
stopping purchases . . . or publicly disclosing negative information would do
more harm than good to the fund . . . .”108
The majority circuits (the Fifth and Eighth) have concluded that prudent
fiduciaries cannot plausibly view disclosing their company’s fraudulent
behavior to be more beneficial to the fund than harmful.109 The Second
Circuit has taken the opposite position.110 The majority circuits have
extended Dudenhoeffer beyond the practical realities of long-term investing
by analyzing short-term harm without analyzing long-term harm.111 Also,
the majority circuits do precisely what Justice Breyer warned against in

105. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 222–31 (noting the Court’s doubts that Congress
intended medical decisions to be considered fiduciary decisions).
106. See id. at 231–37.
107. Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2018); Martone v.
Robb, 902 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2018); Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767 (8th Cir.
2020).
108. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 429–30 (2014) (articulating
the test for the first time); see also Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 577 U.S. 508 (2016) (per
curiam) (remanding a Ninth Circuit case with instructions to follow the Dudenhoeffer
test).
109. See, e.g., Martone, 902 F.3d at 527 (finding that disclosure was not “so clearly
beneficial” to be availing for plaintiffs’ pleading).
110. See Jander, 910 F.3d at 631 (noting that while the Dudenhoeffer standard is a
demanding one, at the pleading stage, with all inferences drawn in plaintiff’s favor,
general economic principles can be accepted, and if needed, rejected at a later stage of
the suit).
111. Cf. Richard Best, 3 Reasons Not to Sell After a Market Downturn, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021116/3-reasons-not-sell-aftermarket-downturn.asp (last updated Aug. 30, 2021) (arguing that large market dips, even
crashes like 2008 and Brexit reactions, should not affect long-term portfolio strategies
because it is not “part of the plan”).
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Dudenhoeffer; they foreclose all avenues to recovery for plaintiffs.112 Last,
the majority circuits violate traditional notions of the fiduciary duty to avoid
conflicts of interest and duties to serve shareholders and other
stakeholders.113
A. The Harm Inquiry of a Retirement Fund Cannot Be Confined to a
Short-Term Stock Drop
The Eighth Circuit, relying on the Fifth’s decision in Martone,
inappropriately cabins its analysis of harm into a short-term stock drop
inquiry.114 When courts answer Dudenhoeffer’s pivotal inquiry, “could a
reasonably prudent fiduciary have viewed the proposed alternative as more
harmful,” the majority circuits are satisfied by the mere possibility of a
reactionary drop in stock prices following disclosure.115 This shallow
analysis is: (1) too defense-friendly, like the presumption of prudence in
Dudenhoeffer; and (2) particularly inappropriate because the funds at issue
are retirement funds which are inherently focused on long-term returns.116
The Supreme Court, in Dudenhoeffer, rejected a defense-friendly
presumption of prudent decision-making adopted by every circuit court to
consider the presumption and noted that the defense-friendly, judicial
creation inappropriately tipped the balance struck by Congress between the
interests of ESOP participants and the encouragement of ESOP creation.117
A shallow inquiry of the pivotal question set forth in Dudenhoeffer, which
112. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 424–25 (acknowledging the competing concerns
of Congress but finding that the presumption of prudence would make it impossible for
plaintiffs to plead even meritorious cases).
113. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV.
1951, 1963–67 (2018) (describing a lack of academic agreement on whether shareholder
theory is a norm or law but maintaining that shareholder theory is a staple of fiduciary
duties in corporate law).
114. See Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 774–75 (8th Cir. 2020)
(accepting, presumably, any drop in value for any length of time as sufficient).
115. See id. at 775 (relying on Martone to accept alleged harm without analyzing the
length or extent of probable harm).
116. See Kent Greenfield, The Rise of the Working Class Shareholder: An
Application, An Extension, and a Challenge, 99 B.U. L. REV. 303, 306 (2019) (noting
that unlike some short-term focused shareholders, retirement funds are the “prototypical
long-term” funds where beneficiaries seek increased value over time); U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., RETIREMENT PLANS AND ERISA 6,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs (last
visited Sept. 29, 2021) (noting that at the federal level, plan participants are not entitled
to receive benefits until they are sixty-five years old, have invested in the plan for ten
years, or are no longer employed by the company).
117. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 412, 425 (“weeding out” the “plausible sheep
from the meritless goats” was a valid concern, but the presumption did not serve this
concern in a way that protected the “plausible sheep”).
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effectively forecloses plaintiffs’ recoveries, is similarly too defense-friendly
and tips the balance against ESOP participants enforcing their rights.118
The shallow inquiry suffers another deficiency aside from failing
Dudenhoeffer’s balancing consideration.119 Given that the funds at issue are
retirement funds, an analysis of harm that is unconcerned with the long-term
well-being of the fund is inappropriate.120 The short-term stock drop
consideration may be one factor in the analysis, but the reasonably prudent
fiduciary analysis cannot be readily separated from the fact that these cases
ask what a prudent fiduciary of a retirement fund would do.121 Whereas a
day trader or general shareholder in a company may devalue a stock based
on its short-term value, an ESOP beneficiary valuing the stock will be more
concerned with its long-term value.122
If immediate disclosure of fraud would halve the value of a fund in one
month but the fund would recover in one year, no reasonable fiduciary could
argue that delayed disclosure was a prudent decision for a retirement fund.123
Considerations of long-term value are entirely missing from the Eighth
Circuit’s analysis.124

118. See id. at 424 (rejecting a presumption of prudence, in part, because it forecloses
even the most meritorious claims by plaintiffs).
119. See id. (quoting Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010)) (describing
the balance as between the “fair and prompt enforcement of” beneficiaries’ rights and
the creation of ESOPs).
120. See Greenfield, supra note 116, at 306.
121. See id. (noting that “any effort by companies to prioritize short-term returns at
the expense of the long-term health of the company will be opposed by employee
investors” of pensions funds).
122. Compare Justin Kuepper, Day Trading: An Introduction, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/trading/05/011705.asp (last updated Sept. 8,
2021) (noting that day traders profit from small changes in the market over short time
scales), with Akhilesh Ganti, Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/esop.asp (last updated Apr. 8, 2021) (noting that
an ESOP’s value to beneficiaries stems from their ability to “cash out” upon retirement
or quitting their existing job because the stock cannot be kept by the employee after they
are no longer working).
123. See Victoria Schwartz, Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies, 40 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 487, 493 (2013) (noting that empirical economic studies show investors value
disclosure requirements because relevant information gives investors confidence in their
decisions and protects the “believability of the flow of information” and that lack of
disclosure creates an assumption of the worst).
124. See Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 774–75 (8th Cir. 2020) (deciding,
briefly, that a prudent fiduciary could find earlier disclosure “more harmful,” but not
placing the harm in any temporal context).
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Allen Rejects General Economic Principles by Inaccurately
Characterizing Those Principles as Too “Generic”

One criticism of the “stock-drop” plaintiffs’ arguments is a reliance upon
the “general economic principle” that fraud is more harmful over time.125
However, any concerns of excessively generic assertions are quelled by
analyzing whether “inevitable disclosure” is plausibly pleaded.126 The
majority circuits are correct that generic claims of “inevitable disclosure”
should not be availing to plaintiffs.127 But where inevitable disclosure can
be specifically alleged, as is often the case, “general economic principles”
should be sufficient.128 Further, the Eighth Circuit’s concern with plaintiffs’
claims being “too generic” would be more properly aimed at later stages of
litigation, as opposed to the pleading stage where plaintiffs need only allege
facts that make their right to recovery “plausible,” not “likely to prevail.”129
Relatedly, whether the “general economic theories” are persuasive is better
left to a jury, as a question of fact, rather than a judge, as a question of law.130
If inevitable discovery can be specifically alleged, plaintiffs’ cases are
more compelling.131 Defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs’ allegations are
“too generic” are more properly aimed at the “inevitable discovery”
allegation than the “fraud over time” assumption.132 The argument that
fraud, concealed over time, does more harm to the company than fraud, selfdisclosed after a brief amount of time is well supported.133
However, an inquiry into whether inevitable disclosure has been properly
alleged would comport with the “context specific analysis” mandated by the
125. See id. at 773–74 (pointing to similar arguments made in Martone).
126. See id. at 774–75 (criticizing Jander’s inevitability decisions by noting that the

sale of the company was only “likely,” meaning it was not inevitable).
127. See id. at 774 (noting that generic inevitable disclosure claims satisfying the
Dudenhoeffer pleading standard have only been successful in Jander).
128. See id. at 771 (pleading that Wells Fargo was already under investigation by a
government regulator because indicators of fraud had been detected).
129. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting that when accepting
pleadings as true, the plaintiff need only state a claim that is “plausible on its face,” not
one that is probable).
130. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287–88 (1982) (noting the
differences between questions of law and questions of fact).
131. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 629–30 (2d Cir. 2018)
(accepting plaintiff’s allegations that disclosure of the fraud was inevitable and that
exposure of longer-term fraud would undermine a company’s credibility).
132. See generally Schwartz, supra note 123 (explaining that shareholders value
negative information because its disclosure makes the company more believable).
133. See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1887, 1903–06 (2013) (noting the different kinds of harm that a fraudulent disclosure to
a regulator makes, which a self-reported disclosure, by extension, would not).
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Dudenhoeffer Court.134 Whether a company’s fraud would inevitably have
been discovered requires a case-by-case analysis.135 The Allen court’s
accusation that Jander’s analysis is too generalized is misplaced.136 By
rejecting “general economic principles” and foreclosing those principles as
a matter of law, the majority circuits inhibit, rather than promote, case-bycase analysis.
B. The Eighth Circuit Effectively Adopts a New
Presumption of Prudence
In Dudenhoeffer, the Court rejected a judicially created “presumption of
prudence” because it barred plaintiffs’ recovery unless the company was on
the verge of collapse.137 The Eighth Circuit’s rejection of the proposed
alternative action of disclosing fraud, even in the face of inevitable
discovery, is a similar de facto bar to recovery.138
Thus far, every proposed alternative action has been rejected as
implausible.139
Selling the stock violates insider trading laws.140
Diversifying the fund imposes a duty explicitly precluded by the statute’s
plain language.141 Freezing future purchases of the employer’s stock has not
been presented to a circuit court post-Dudenhoeffer, but likely violates
insider trading principles and would signal to the public that something was
wrong with the fund.142 This likely leaves only one avenue open for plaintiffs
to recover: a duty to disclose fraud.
The Second Circuit acknowledged the proposed alternative inquiry is fact-

134. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (rejecting
the presumption of prudent investing by ESOP fiduciaries because it foreclosed broad
classes of plaintiffs instead of evaluating individual cases).
135. See id.
136. See Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 2020) (suggesting
Jander’s analysis is applicable in every stock-drop case).
137. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 425.
138. See Allen, 967 F.3d at 773 (noting that Dudenhoeffer’s standard was a demanding
one yet foreclosing on plaintiffs’ primary argument in circuit courts to date).
139. See id. (foreclosing disclosure as an option that no prudent fiduciary would
forego).
140. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 423 (rejecting any proposed alternatives that
require a fiduciary to break insider trading laws). See generally Andrew W. Marrero,
Insider Trading: Inside the Quagmire, 17 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 234 (2020) (noting the
complex and confusing nature of insider trading laws and the statute’s lack of clarity).
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (exempting fiduciaries from the diversification
requirements of ERISA because it defeats the inherent purpose of ESOPs).
142. See Allen, 967 F.3d at 775 (arguing that an action which “spooks the market”
could reasonably be anticipated by a fiduciary to cause an outsized stock drop).
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specific.143 This language is noticeably absent from the Eighth Circuit’s
rationale.144 Additionally, the brief and summary dismissal of plaintiffs’
suggestion that earlier disclosure of fraud is better for the health of the fund,
suggests a de facto foreclosure on plaintiffs pleading any alternative course
of action in a duty-of-prudence ERISA claim.145
If the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation were to prevail, plaintiffs in these
cases would be forced to use the “absent special circumstances” caveats the
courts have attached to each of the foreclosed alternative actions.146 This
regime is the new presumption of prudence.147 If plaintiffs are not entitled
to recovery, absent special circumstances, this has the same effect as the
presumption of prudence.148 In essence, the majority Circuits presume that
fiduciaries have no duty to disclose fraud because they reject economic
theories that suggest fraud causes increased harm over time.149 In this way,
should the Supreme Court reject Jander’s interpretation of the Dudenhoeffer
test, it would effectively reject the part of Dudenhoeffer that seeks to
preserve plan beneficiaries’ abilities to assert their rights.150
C. The Eighth Circuit Allows Fiduciary Behavior Which
Contradicts Traditional Notions of the Fiduciary Duty
The fiduciary’s duties are plainly outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).151
The plan fiduciary may only act for the benefit of “participants” and
“beneficiaries” of the ESOP.152 Neither definition includes the interests of
143. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 626 (2d Cir. 2018)
(examining the Court’s “context-sensitive scrutiny” inquiry set forth in Dudenhoeffer).
144. See Allen, 967 F.3d at 774–77 (lacking a fact-specific inquiry).
145. See id. at 774–75 (finding plaintiffs’ claims based on general economic
principles inadequate even with all inferences drawn in plaintiffs’ favor).
146. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Duddenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 426 (2014) (leaving
open the possibility for plaintiffs to allege public information forms a basis to propose
the fiduciary should have recognized the stock was overvalued).
147. See Allen, 967 F.3d at 773–74 (rejecting the economic theories that fraud is more
harmful over time because if they truly were “generally known” then the Fifth Circuit
would not have found for defendants in Whitley).
148. See id. (suggesting that unless new, more convincing data supports the “general
economic principles,” they will be unavailing to plaintiffs in any case brought in this
circuit).
149. See id. at 773–75 (explaining and rejecting general economic principles because
they would apply in “virtually every fraud case” and this was inherently impossible
because Martone found the principles inapplicable).
150. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 429–30 (stating the test for a claim of the breach
of the duty of prudence); see also id. at 424 (quoting Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S.
506, 517 (2010)) (noting concern for upholding beneficiaries’ rights).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
152. Id.
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the company or the employer.153 This accords with ESOPs being a form of
cooperative where employees are given additional incentives to better the
company.154 Several interests are served by disclosing fraud, including
correction of inflated stock price, informing investors of facts pertinent to
their assets, and the potential benefit of reducing harm over the long-term.155
Thus, plaintiffs operating under this theory of the case have, at minimum,
met the low standards of mere “plausible pleading.”156
Similarly, traditional notions of shareholder theory, which are deeply
embedded in U.S. economic policies, including ERISA, run contrary to the
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning.157 Shareholder theory is the basic notion that
business’ sole obligations are to maximize shareholder value.158 Thus,
allowing ERISA fiduciaries to avoid disclosing fraud, considering general
economic principles, violates shareholder theory and ERISA’s explicit
commands.159
i.

Defendants in Stock-Drop Cases Overextend Pegram

Defendants in Dudenhoeffer cases assert that a plan fiduciary who is also
a corporate officer cannot be held personally liable for actions taken in their
corporate capacity that are not for the exclusive benefit of ESOP
153. Id. § 1002(7)–(8).
154. See Ganti, supra note 122 (listing the incentive structure of ESOPs).
155. See Jared A. Funk, What’s the Price Tag?: Measuring the Economic Impacts of

Fraud, FRAUD MAG. (May/June 2015), https://www.fraud-magazine.com/
article.aspx?id=4294988056 (listing factors that exacerbate the harms of fraud, including
the possible increase in harm over time, the harm of a cover-up, the costs of an
investigation, and how many higherups are involved). But see Rebekah Susan Mammen
& Vinisha Verghese Edakalathur, Forensic Accounting: Impact of Fraud on Stock Price,
8 INT’L J. OF BUS. & MGMT. INVENTION 89, 91–95 (2019) (analyzing stock prices of three
companies after fraud announcements and finding no price change).
156. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (establishing that pleadings cannot
be hypothetically possible, but rather must be minimally plausible).
157. See Greenfield, supra note 116, at 303–04 (detailing the “enduring” debate
between shareholder theory and stakeholder theory and recent legislation incorporating
the former).
158. See Peter Landau, Stakeholder vs. Shareholder: How They’re Different & Why
It Matters, PROJECT MANAGER (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.projectmanager.com/
blog/stakeholder-vs-shareholder (defining “shareholder” and comparing and contrasting
with the related term “stakeholder”). But see Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose
of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUS.
ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/businessroundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-thatserves-all-americans (announcing a shift from focus on shareholders to a focus on
stakeholders).
159. See Funk, supra note 155 (detailing the harms shareholders incur in the event of
fraud); 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(A) (mandating a lone duty to beneficiaries).
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participants/beneficiaries.160 Relying on Pegram, defendants make an
improper assumption that ESOP beneficiaries’ interests are severable from
what is beneficial for shareholders generally.161 Further, these arguments
overextend the portion of ERISA that allows for these dual roles while
ignoring the portion of ERISA which, in conjunction with the common law
of trusts, directs fiduciaries to avoid conflicts of interests.162
But more importantly, Pegram is readily distinguishable from the current
circuit disagreement.163 The Court in Pegram was hesitant to hold a
physician liable for medical decisions which did not align with plaintiff’s
financial interests.164 Those specific and valid hesitations are not applicable
in traditional Dudenhoeffer cases.
D. Defendants Rely on Two Primary Arguments
Several counterarguments face the Second Circuit’s reasoning. Some of
these counterarguments have merit, while others stretch the bounds of logical
consistency.165 Two prevailing arguments dominate the case law.166
i.

Allowing Plaintiffs to Proceed Based on Economic Generalities
Are Applicable to Any Stock-Drop Case

The Eighth Circuit criticizes the Second Circuit as allowing plaintiffs to
proceed based on an allegation that any plaintiff in any Dudenhoeffer case
could make.167 This criticism is misplaced.
160. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 32–35 (arguing that the Jander
plaintiffs are seeking to hold defendants liable for not disclosing the overvaluation in
quarterly SEC filings, which combined with the argument that defendants would spook
the market in a disclosure outside of normal filings should result in a judgement for IBM).
161. See Landau, supra note 158 (defining “shareholder” and “stakeholder” in such a
way that ESOP beneficiaries can be properly categorized as both).
162. See generally Fred Reish, The Fiduciary Rule: What’s Next (Part 4)?:
Interesting Angles on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule #88, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/fiduciary-rule-what-s-next-part-4-interestingangles-dol-s-fiduciary-rule-88 (noting the duty to avoid conflicts of interest).
163. See generally Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (detailing a situation in
which a physician would be held liable for medical decisions that were antithetical to the
beneficiary’s pecuniary interest).
164. See id. at 218–22 (noting the dangers of physicians making health decisions
while considering financial interests).
165. Compare Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 2 (stating Jander’s argument as
“[i]f the harm from undisclosed fraud only grows over time and no fraud lasts forever,
then disclosure is always inevitable and earlier disclosure is always the prudent course”),
with id. at 14 (noting that under Pegram, plan fiduciaries have no duty to beneficiaries
when acting in their corporate capacity).
166. See id. at 25–32 (presenting two arguments against Jander).
167. See Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 2020) (suggesting

2021

DUDENHOEFFER: CONCEALMENT OF FRAUD

375

As an initial matter, reliance on a “general economic theory” is likely
unavailing for plaintiffs if they cannot specifically allege facts necessary to
show inevitable disclosure.168 If disclosure appears to have been
concealable, then the “general economic principle” that fraud is more
harmful over time is irrelevant.169 Specific facts are required in plaintiffs’
pleadings which tend to show the fraud would inevitability have been
disclosed.170
Moreover, the general economic principles plaintiffs assert are sound.171
When fraud is uncovered, as opposed to self-reported, investors distrust the
company in the future and are less likely to invest in it.172 The Jander
plaintiffs supported this “general economic principle” with various peerreviewed economic analyses.173 Fiduciaries opting not to disclose known
fraud are likely calculating the harms to the company and its short-term
investors, not the harms to ESOP beneficiaries saving for retirement.174
ii.

The Second Circuit’s Precedent Would Allow Excessively
Burdensome Discovery

Another critique of Jander lies in its alleged consequences. The majority
circuits, as well as other sources, suggest that Jander’s precedent allows for
burdensome discovery if plaintiffs can use “general economic principles.”175
This critique runs contrary to the considerations laid forth in

that if the use of “general economic principles” was sufficient, then plaintiffs would be
allowed to proceed in “virtually every fraud case”).
168. See id. (detailing the Jander plaintiffs’ specific allegations which suggested
inevitable discovery of fraud).
169. See generally Schwartz, supra note 123 (listing the harms caused by fraud which
result from a reaction to its discovery becoming public knowledge).
170. See id.
171. See Funk, supra note 155 (detailing the harms shareholders incur in the event of
fraud).
172. See id.
173. See Allen, 967 F.3d at 774 (citing Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d
620 (2d Cir. 2018)) (noting that the Jander plaintiffs cited several “economic analyses”).
174. Stephen P. Ferris & A.C. Pritchard, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud
Class Actions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 33–34 (Univ. Mich.,
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 01-009, 2001),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=288216 (noting the primary harm to stock comes from the
initial revelation of the fraud and the effects slowly fade).
175. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 6, 17–18, 31–32 (arguing that the
Jander court’s precedent would allow for frivolous claims to proceed, contravening
Dudenhoeffer’s concern with weeding out “the plausible sheep from meritless goats”);
Wilson v. Edison Int’l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (agreeing with
the rationale in Amgen in the absence of Ninth Circuit guidance).
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Dudenhoeffer.176 There, the Court was not concerned with burdensome
discovery, but rather, with meritless discovery.177
Understandably,
defendants do not allege plaintiffs’ claims are meritless.178
While Dudenhoeffer explicitly noted that Congress sought to encourage
the creation of ESOP funds, this concern cannot outweigh Dudenhoeffer’s
other concern of beneficiaries enforcing their rights.179 Plan beneficiaries’
right to recover their retirement funds lost through fraud should outweigh the
mere specter of excessive litigation and subsequent discovery which might
discourage the creation of ESOPs.180 Indeed, Dudenhoeffer was explicitly
cognizant of foreclosing all of plaintiffs’ avenues to recovery when it
rejected the “presumption of prudence.”181 Enacting a similar bar to recovery
here, based merely on speculatively excessive discovery, runs contrary to
Dudenhoeffer’s explicit rationale for meritorious discovery.182
E. The Pegram Problem
Treating the duties of plan fiduciary and corporate officer as readily
severable is unnecessary and, even if it were necessary, unworkable.183
Majority courts and critics of the Second Circuit argue that Pegram
forecloses plaintiffs’ recovery in these cases because defendants would be
held liable for their actions as non-fiduciaries.184 Pegram forecloses
plaintiffs from holding plan fiduciaries liable for actions taken in their
176. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (noting any
proper standard for ESOP cases should be aimed at weeding out frivolous claims).
177. See id.
178. See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44 (arguing throughout that in
future hypothetical cases, where fraud may or may not have occurred, the Jander
decision would allow for burdensome discovery, but never alleging that Jander’s case
itself was meritless).
179. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 424–25.
180. See generally Teresa Ghilarducci, Big Retirement Losses If The Market Crashes
Tomorrow, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2018, 3:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/teresa
ghilarducci/2018/12/05/big-retirement-losses-if-the-market-crashes-tomorrow/?sh=1ad
0ad547dab (estimating that retirement funds lost $2.4 trillion in the last two quarters of
2008).
181. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 425 (noting the presumption of prudence operates
to bar all plaintiffs from enforcing their rights under an ESOP).
182. See id. at 424 (noting a concern for “meritless, economically burdensome
lawsuits”).
183. See ROSEN ET AL., supra note 7 (noting the inherent risks associated with being
an insider ESOP fiduciary and how to handle the position with minimum litigation
exposure).
184. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225–26 (2000) (stating that fiduciaries
under ERISA may only “wear their fiduciary hat” when acting in a way that will affect
beneficiaries).
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corporate capacity that were not to their exclusive benefit.185
“The Pegram problem” arises in specific, but not all, Dudenhoeffer
cases.186 When plaintiffs argue that a disclosure of fraud should have been
made, defendants can argue that unusual disclosure made outside the normal
reporting regime could dramatically “spook the market.”187 In response,
plaintiffs may contend that the plan fiduciary, in their corporate capacity,
should have made a disclosure in a standard reporting schedule, such as a
quarterly SEC report.188
The majority circuits, when confronted with the Pegram problem, have
accepted that standard reporting is an action done solely in a corporate officer
capacity and thus the plan fiduciary is not obligated to act in the interest of
plan beneficiaries by disclosing.189 However, defendants using Pegram
ignore ERISA’s duty to avoid conflicts of interest.190 Courts could reason
that in like situations, corporate officers violate their duty to avoid conflicts
of interest by omitting known fraud.191
IV. JANDER REQUIRES UPROOTING LESS CASE LAW
The Eighth Circuit unavoidably contradicts parts of Dudenhoeffer.192 If
the Court were to distinguish Pegram from the current disagreement, the

185. See id. at 213 (noting the “fatal difficulties” such a holding would yield,
particularly for physician-fiduciaries).
186. See, e.g., Martone v. Robb, 902 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding no Pegram
problem because plaintiffs did not allege an alternative action that the defendant should
have taken in a non-fiduciary capacity).
187. Contra Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 628–29 (2d Cir. 2018)
(rejecting this argument).
188. See id. at 630 (accepting such an argument as plausible, but also finding it
unnecessary because the Court rejected defendant’s argument).
189. See Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 788 F.3d 916, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2015) (agreeing with
the Sixth Circuit in Dudenhoeffer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.
2012), that reports are made in a fiduciary capacity only); Amgen Inc. v. Harris, 577 U.S.
308, 311 (2016) (reiterating that the disclosure argument may work, but ultimately the
Dudenhoeffer standard must be satisfied). Contra Deak v. Masters, Mates & Pilots
Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 572, 580 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that ERISA plan fiduciaries
have a duty to avoid situations where their actions as corporate officers will conflict with
complete loyalty to plan beneficiaries).
190. Deak, 821 F.2d at 580.
191. See id.
192. See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 424 (2014) (quoting
Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 517 (2010)) (recognizing the balance struck by
ERISA in “ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the
encouragement of the creation of such plans”).
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resolution would be straightforward and uphold the balance pursued in
Dudenhoeffer.193
A. Unless the Supreme Court Intends to Overturn Dudenhoeffer, It Must
Reject Some Part of the Eighth Circuit’s Rationale
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to resolve this disagreement
and should clarify that the majority circuits cannot mandate blanket dismissal
of a plaintiff’s case merely because the plaintiff’s proposed alternative action
requires the defendant to disclose their previous fraudulent behavior.194 A
bright-line rule which construes this proposed alternative to be inherently
implausible runs afoul of basic tenets of shareholder theory by allowing
fiduciaries to blatantly disregard shareholder and stakeholder value.195
Additionally, any such bright-line rule would also run contrary to the Court’s
statement in Dudenhoeffer that the inquiry is inherently context specific.196
Even Jander’s critics acknowledge this is the proper inquiry.197
Alternatively, the Court should allow “inevitable discovery” cases to
proceed as they significantly bolster a plaintiff’s claim that earlier disclosure
is preferable in those situations.198 The Court should reemphasize what it
considered relevant in the Dudenhoeffer decision — that a general economic
theory can be an appropriate consideration.199 The Court should reject the
argument that plaintiffs rely on “generic accusations” that will be alleged in
all stock drop cases.200 Even if plaintiffs are relying on general economic
principles, they cannot proceed to discovery without specific allegations of
fraud that are sufficiently plausible under Twombly/Iqbal.201
Last, the Court should clarify that lower courts may not cabin the
193. See id.
194. See id. at 425 (rejecting standard which makes plaintiff’s enforcement of rights

impossible).
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 2020) (arguing
that Jander’s interpretation violates the context specific requirement, in their view,
because general economic principles can be alleged by plaintiffs in every case).
198. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 155 (suggesting that fraud concealed overtime is more
harmful).
199. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 426–27 (relying on the fact that “many investors
take the view” that trying to outperform markets is unrealistic).
200. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 629–30 (2d Cir. 2018)
(noting that in all cases, the economic theories alone will not suffice without other “factspecific” arguments).
201. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (establishing that pleadings
must be “plausible” and not “merely possible”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007) (creating plausible pleading standard).
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harm/benefit analysis to considering short-term value of the investment
assets comprising the ESOP. Fiduciaries correctly argue disclosure of fraud
can and often does cause short-term stock devaluation; however, plaintiffs
must be allowed to counter with considerations of the harm of overvalued
stock prices, underinformed investors, and the long-term harm of ongoing
fraud in a business.202 At the very least, the Court should allow for a caseby-case determination of this plausibility analysis. To this end, the Court
should expressly reject the reasoning of the majority circuits insofar as they
forego a context specific analysis for a blanket foreclosure upon plaintiffs’
recoveries.
B. The Court Should Distinguish Dudenhoeffer Cases
from Pegram
The Pegram problem is entirely avoidable because the Pegram case is
easily distinguishable from Dudenhoeffer cases.203 The Court should
distinguish Pegram because Dudenhoeffer cases do not involve a conflict
between financial concerns and health concerns. Inarguably, a physician
need not make medical decisions solely for the financial benefit of the
patient-beneficiary.204
Dudenhoeffer cases frequently concern plan fiduciaries making SEC
filings.205 Defendants in these cases argue that SEC filings are made solely
in a corporate officer capacity, but this is not self-evident.206 The Court
should find that SEC filings are made in both a plan fiduciary and corporate
officer capacity. Such a finding is bolstered by the argument that disclosures
in SEC filings are not for the sole benefit of ESOP beneficiaries but for the
corporate shareholders as well.207
C. The Court Should Resolve Any Potential Contradiction Within
Dudenhoeffer and its Progeny
The Court should explicitly acknowledge and clarify which Dudenhoeffer
202. See Schwartz, supra note 123 (explaining that empirical studies show part of the
harm experienced by fraud is a lasting lack of trust of future disclosures).
203. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231–32 (2000) (considering important
the unusual case of a fiduciary-physician).
204. See id.
205. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 19, 24–25 (noting the argument that
fiduciaries should disclose in standard SEC filings, and that the lawyers for several
Dudenhoeffer cases were the same and made the same arguments).
206. See id. at 30–31 (stating that when disclosures are made in SEC filings, they are
done so in a corporate capacity, not a fiduciary capacity).
207. See Schwartz, supra note 123 (arguing that a lack of information harms
shareholders).
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test is correct. In one part of Dudenhoeffer, the Court tells lower courts to
analyze whether a reasonable fiduciary “would” not have viewed the
proposed alternative as more likely to harm the fund than to help it.208 Later
in the opinion, the Court uses “could” instead, suggesting a more demanding
standard.209
To decide which test is correct, the Court should consider the two options
in the context of other considerations from Dudenhoeffer. Dudenhoeffer
articulates the balance the Court strikes between the encouragement of
ESOPs and the ability of plaintiffs to enforce their rights as plan
beneficiaries.210 In doing so, the Court struck down a judicial creation it
found too defense-friendly.211 If the Court finds Jander’s reasoning
unconvincing, it should nonetheless find that siding with the majority would
violate the previously articulated concern of beneficiary rights and avoiding
judicial creations which are too defense-friendly.212 To that end, the Court
should establish the “would” test as the correct test to achieve the balance it
initially articulated in Dudenhoeffer.213 Even on remand, the Court
instructed the Second Circuit to use both tests to reconsider arguments,
suggesting a contradiction still needing resolution.214
V. CONCLUSION
Dudenhoeffer created a high burden for plaintiffs. While setting that
standard, however, the Court explicitly acknowledged that it still disfavored
overly defense-friendly judicial creations.215
The Eighth Circuit’s
interpretation closes yet another door on plaintiffs’ plausibly proposed

208. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 428 (2014) (emphasis
added) (“To state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence . . . a plaintiff must plausibly
allege an alternative action . . . that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would
not have viewed it as more likely to harm the fund than to help it.”).
209. Id. at 430 (emphasis added) (“[L]ower courts . . . should also consider whether
the complaint has plausibly alleged that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant’s position
could not have concluded . . . disclosing negative information would do more harm than
good to the fund . . . .”).
210. Id. at 424 (stating that the Court agrees that there needs to be a balance between
allowing beneficiaries to enforce their rights and promoting ESOPs as Congress wants).
211. See id. at 418–19 (holding that there is no defense-friendly “presumption of
prudence” exception created by the law).
212. Id. at 424.
213. Id. at 428.
214. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 140 S. Ct. 592, 594 (2020) (per curiam)
(using the “would” test in one paragraph, then “could” in the following).
215. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 425 (stating the appropriate test should weed out
only meritless claims).
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alternative actions.216 The decision is merely another defense-friendly
judicial creation.217
Unless the Supreme Court wishes to effectively overrule Dudenhoeffer,
the Eighth Circuit cannot prevail. At the very least, the Court would have to:
(1) reaffirm that the inquiry is fact-intensive and the proposals of disclosing
fraud cannot be presumptively implausible; (2) allow for a more lenient
inquiry in cases where plaintiffs allege the fraud would inevitably be
discovered; or (3) provide some other proposed alternative plaintiffs may
allege which would allow plaintiffs to recover from fiduciaries who
concealed information which decreased the value of retirement funds.
Surely, when the Dudenhoeffer Court, in the absence of SEC guidance, set
out to define the inquiry courts should conduct on plaintiff’s duty-ofprudence suits, they did not envision an outcome where plaintiffs cannot
plausibly allege any alternative action fiduciaries should have taken.218 The
Fifth and Eighth Circuits, however, do just that.

216. Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2020).
217. See Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 412 (holding that the presumption was foreign to

any other duty-of-prudence case and was inappropriate).
218. See id. at 429 (noting a lack of SEC guidance).

